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This paper aims at localizing network-specific market power in new markets. 
Three kinds of transmission qualities on service markets can be differentiated 
according to the products provided: narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN or 
GSM, semi high-speed broadband services like broadband internet access up to 
6 Mbps download and VDSL services up to 50 Mbps. As long as, due to the ab-
sence of alternative network infrastructures, a monopolistic bottleneck in local 
infrastructure networks exists the question arises what the remaining bottleneck 
components are for these different markets. In this paper the shrinking-
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1.    Introduction 
 
From the very beginning of the EU liberalization of the telecommunications sec-
tor the focus was on the involvement of new and innovative telecommunications 
markets. In the meantime, an intention to avoid overregulation with respect to 
new markets can be observed in the EU telecommunications regulatory frame-
work. A clear-cut economically based analysis of the remaining need for sector-
specific regulation is still missing. Such an approach should focus on a firm’s 
network-specific market power. A necessary requirement for future regulatory 
reform is the application of a so-called symmetrical regulatory approach. This 
means that regulation should focus on network-specific market power based on 
monopolistic bottlenecks with no intrinsic bias towards any firm or technology. 
 
The question is whether monopolistic bottlenecks will become more or less se-
vere with the emergence of new markets. For that, we shall analyse three differ-
ent markets for network services: narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN or 
GSM, semi high-speed broadband services like broadband internet access up to 
6 Mbps download and VDSL services up to 50 Mbps. As long as, due to the ab-
sence of alternative network infrastructures, a monopolistic bottleneck in local 
infrastructure networks exists, the question arises what the remaining bottleneck 
components are that constitute necessary input for these different markets. In 
this paper the hypothesis of a shrinking bottleneck will be demonstrated.  
 
The paper starts with a description of the EU telecommunications policy regard-
ing new markets since the abolishment of legal entry barriers (see section 2). 
From there it proceeds to explain the reference point, i.e. how the regulatory 
subject is to be defined based on network economics (see section 3). This part of 
the paper is followed by the implications for telecommunications regulation (see 
section 4). Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
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2.    New markets and EU telecommunications policy 
 
EU telecommunications policy has played a key role in the process towards en-
try deregulation. The Commission of the European Communities has initiated a 
wide-ranging debate on the possibilities of completing  the common internal 
market for telecommunications in the European Community. Obviously, this 
effort was strongly related to the Commission’s endeavour to complete the 
common market by 1992. The first step was towards open network provision 
(ONP) which was introduced to stimulate entry to the new markets for value 
added network services in 1990. Its aim was partial entry deregulation in order 
to establish non-discriminatory access to monopolistic network infrastructures 
(e.g. Knieps, 2001, p. 645).
1 The Commission again strongly influenced the 
process of full liberalization of European telecommunications. The “Full Com-
petition Directive”
2 of 13 March 1996 obligated the member countries to allow 
free entry into all parts of telecommunications. The new telecommunications 
laws allowing overall market entry were enacted by the national parliaments 
during 1996, coming fully into effect on 1 January 1998. 
 
 
2.1.  EU regulatory framework 1998 
 
As a consequence of global entry deregulation the question became relevant 
how the division of labor between sector-specific market power deregulation 
and general competition law ought to be realized. In the following we point out 
that EU telecommunications policy has so far been rather contradictory and in-
consistent and therefore has not been successful in implementing an economi-
cally based concept for preventing the abuse of sector-specific market power. 
 
                                                 
1   Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal 
market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network 
provision, OJ L 192, 24. 7. 1990, p.1. 
2   Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC 
with regard to the implementation of full competition in the telecommunications 
markets, OJ L 74, 22. 3. 1996, p. 13.   3
A first important corner stone within the EU-ONP-regulation followed with the 
European Commission’s “Access Notice”.
3 This document pointed out the im-
portance of the concept of the “essential facilities” indispensable for reaching 
customers (section 68) within the context of EU competition law, in particular 
Article 82 (e.g. Ungerer, 2000, p. 217). The expression “essential facilities” is 
used to describe a facility or an infrastructure which is essential for reaching 
customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which 
cannot be replicated by reasonable means. With the supply of access to the facil-
ity to one or more competitors the abuse of a dominant position and the possibil-
ity of thus preventing the emergence of a new product or service should be 
avoided (see Ungerer, 2000, p. 229).  
 
 
2.2.  EU Review 1999 and EU regulatory framework 2003 
 
In 1999 a EU Review started with the aim of maximizing the application of the 
general European competition law, the minimization of sector-specific regula-
tion, a rigorous phasing out of unnecessary regulation, and the introduction of 
“sunset” clauses. Nevertheless, the unspecific regulatory obligations based on 
the EU Directives of the 1999 Review package, in particular the Framework Di-
rective
4, and the Access Directive
5 resulted in a tangle of contradictory decisions 
and statements (see Knieps, 2005, p. 78). The Commission’s Guidelines (see 
European Commission, 2002) do not present a clear and economically well-
founded concept for localising network-specific market power. Markets are de-
fined and market power assessed using the same methodologies as under compe-
tition law (see European Commission, 2002, recital 24). In particular, in order to 
identify significant market power (SMP), the Commission’s Guidelines formu-
                                                 
3   Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the tele-
communications sector.- Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles (98/C265/02), 
Official Journal of the European Communities, 22. 8. 98, pp. 2-28.  
4  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ L108/33, 24. 4. 2002. 
5   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ L108/7, 24. 4. 2002.    4
late a long list of criteria indicating the existence of a dominant position. These 
criteria include: overall size of the undertaking, control of infrastructure not eas-
ily duplicated, technological advantages or superiority, absence of or low coun-
tervailing buying power, easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial 
resources, product/services diversifications, economies of scale, economies of 
scope, vertical integration, a highly developed distribution and sales network, 
absence of potential competition, barriers to expansion (see European Commis-
sion, 2002, recital 78). Even the criteria of general competition law are not con-
sidered consistently. It is stressed, however, that the existence of a dominant po-
sition cannot be established on the sole basis of large market shares and would 
require a thorough and overall analysis of the economic characteristics of the 
relevant market (European Commission, 2002, recital 78). In contrast to the Ac-
cess Notice, it is argued that the doctrine of the ‘essential facilities’ would be 
less relevant for the purposes of ex ante applying Article 14 of the Framework 
Directive than ex post applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (see European 
Commission, 2002, recital 82).
6  
 
At the same time, special rules were developed focusing on the emergence of 
new markets or new products. The application of the essential facilities doctrine 
in the context of article 82 EC Treaty has been considered as relevant where the 
refusal to supply or to grant access to third parties would limit or prevent the 
emergence of new markets or new products (see European Commission, 2002, 
recital 81). Moreover, recital 9 of the Commission’s Guidelines of 2002 states: 
“however, given the dynamic character and functioning of electronic communi-
cations markets, possibilities to overcome barriers within the relevant time hori-
zon have also to be taken into consideration when carrying out a prospective 
analysis to identify the relevant markets for possible ex ante regulation.” Recital 
15 states: “Furthermore, new and emerging markets in which market power may 
be found to exist because of ‘first-mover’ advantages should not in principle be 
subject to ex-ante regulation”. Nevertheless, within the Annex of the same Rec-
ommendations the markets considered for possible regulation may also include 
new markets, such as interactive cable television (see market 12 wholesale 
                                                 
6   This is a definite step away from the Access Notice of August 1998, pointing out the 
importance of ensuring non-discriminatory access to essential facilities.     5
broadband access). The Commission stated: “When there is effective facilities-
based competition, the new framework will require ex-ante regulatory obliga-
tions to be lifted. Investment in new and competing infrastructures will bring 
forward the day when such obligations can be relaxed (see European Commis-
sion, 2003b, p. 6). 
 
 
2.3.  Review 2006 of EU regulatory framework 2003 
 
As a consequence, the future scope of sector-specific regulation regarding new 
markets remained undecided. In 2003, however, the European Commission rec-
ommended the so-called “three criteria test”. This test seems to substantiate the 
requirements for regulatory intervention. The Commission summarizes the three 
criteria as follows “The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory 
entry barriers whether of structural, legal or regulatory nature. … the second cri-
terion admits only those markets, the structure of which does not tend towards 
effective competition within the relevant time horizon. …. The third criterion is 
that application of competition law alone would not adequately address the mar-
ket failure(s) concerned” (see European Commission, 2003a, recital 9). 
 
Thus it can be concluded that within the EU telecommunications regulatory 
framework an intention to avoid overregulation with respect to new markets can 
be observed. However, an economic approach to the remaining need for sector-
specific regulation is still missing. For that, a two-stage procedure is necessary. 
First, the basis for intervention has to be localized. Then, for those markets, and 
only for those, where market power has been identified, appropriate measures 
should be designed and enforced. The criteria on which these measures are 
based are general in the sense that they apply to all network industries (see 
Knieps, 2006a, pp. 53-55). In the following it is shown, that the “three criteria 
test” can be applied in accordance with the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks.  
 
   6
3.    New markets and network-specific market power regulation  
 
3.1.  Localization of monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
EU telecommunications policy has been strongly influenced by asymmetric 
market power regulation with an intrinsic bias against incumbent carriers. Ex-
cessive regulation due to an oversized regulatory basis has occurred (e.g. 
Knieps, 2005). The specification of the regulatory basis is not explicitly founded 
on the identification of network-specific market power, instead classification as 
a dominant firm as laid down in competition law is chosen as the central pre-
condition to justify sector-specific regulation. For example, the provision of 
long-distance telecommunications infrastructure and voice telephony services by 
a carrier classified as dominant on those markets has been considered non-
competitive without considering whether active or potential competition might 
be sufficient to discipline market power. A necessary requirement for future 
regulatory reform is the application of a regulatory approach, focussing on net-
work-specific market power based on monopolistic bottlenecks with no intrinsic 
bias towards any firm or technology (e.g. Knieps, 2006a, pp. 51-59).  
 
Criteria like relative market share, financial strength, access to input and service 
markets etc. can only serve as a starting point in order to evaluate the existence 
of market power; but the development of an ex ante regulatory criterion creates 
a need for a more clear-cut definition of market power. This is even more impor-
tant, because “criteria for conjecturing a dominant position” on the basis of mar-
ket shares can lead to wrong criteria for government intervention in network in-
dustries. 
 
It is important to identify the regulatory basis by means of Stigler’s concept of 
entry barriers, focussing on the long-run cost asymmetries between incumbent 
and potential entrants.
7 The sector-specific characteristics of network structures 
(economies of bundling) are not a sufficient reason to conclude that market 
                                                 
7   “A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of 
output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not 
borne by firms already in the industry” (Stigler, 1968, p. 67).    7
power must exist.
8 It is necessary to differentiate between those areas in which 
active and/or potential competition can work and other areas, so-called monopo-
listic bottleneck areas, where a natural monopoly situation (due to economies of 
bundling) in combination with sunk (irreversible) costs exists. Sunk costs are no 
longer decision-relevant for the incumbent monopoly, whereas the potential en-
trant is confronted with the decision whether or not to build network infrastruc-
ture and thus spend the irreversible costs. The incumbent firm therefore has 
lower decision-relevant costs than potential entrants. This creates scope for stra-
tegic behaviour on the part of the incumbent firm, so that monopoly profits (or 
inefficient production) will not necessarily result in market entry. Regulation of 
network-specific market power is only justified in monopolistic bottleneck ar-
eas. In all other cases, the existence of active and potential competition will lead 
to efficient market results.  
 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks has been developed to provide a consis-
tent analytical basis to identify network-specific market power in all network 
industries, irrespective whether they are static or dynamic. As soon as from an 
ex ante perspective either the natural monopoly condition or the sunk costs or 
both become irrelevant, market power regulation becomes obsolete. Thus the 
necessity of regulation has to be investigated periodically. The development of 
alternative infrastructures should not be disturbed by regulatory interventions. 
Neither the subsidization of competing infrastructures nor access holidays to 
allow excessive profits for a certain period are justified because in both cases the 
competitive reference point of a market-based rate of return on invested capital 
is distorted. Due to the sequential nature of investment decisions (ex ante) and 
regulation of access tariffs (ex post) a regulation-induced hold-up problem 
                                                 
8   The pressure of potential competition can be sufficient to discipline the behaviour of 
the active supplier, even if he is the owner of a natural monopoly. Such networks are 
called “contestable” (Baumol, Panzar, Willig, 1982). It seems obvious that, as soon 
as competition works, the behaviour of markets for network services becomes more 
complex than is assumed in the “simple” model of the theory of contestable markets. 
Examples may be strategies of network differentiation, product differentiation, price 
differentiation, creation of goodwill etc. However, even strategic behaviour on com-
petitive markets for network services should not lead to the opposite conclusion to 
re-regulate these markets. In contrast, the very point of the disaggregated approach is 
the development of the preconditions for competition on the markets for network 
services.   8
would arise. The truncation problem would result in rewarding only ex post suc-
cessful projects, whereas the ex ante risks of project failure would not be com-
pensated.
9 In order to avoid ex post cheating by the regulator’s ignoring inves-
tors’ ex-ante risk, the solution cannot be to favour the application of a wrong 
regulatory instrument. Instead of “access holidays” a disaggregated regulatory 
contract on the statutory level (EU Directives and law of the member states) 
should be applied, which guarantees that the regulation is limited to the mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks and that the applied regulation does not deter the recover-
ing of the ex ante opportunity cost of capital (see Knieps, 2005, pp. 88-91). 
 
The network economic concept of monopolistic bottlenecks suggests a connec-
tion with the essential facilities doctrine resulting from US antitrust law, which 
is now also being used increasingly in European competition law.
10 In accor-
dance with this doctrine, a facility can only be regarded as essential if the fol-
lowing two conditions are fulfilled: (1) market entry to the complementary mar-
ket is not actually possible without access to this facility, and (2) providers on 
the complementary market cannot, using reasonable effort, duplicate the facility; 
substitutes do not exist either (e.g. Areeda, Hoverkamp, 1988).
11 
 
The application of the essential facilities doctrine means that a traditional in-
strument of competition law can be used as a regulatory instrument. A facility is 
regarded as essential when it fulfils the criteria for classification as a monopolis-
tic bottleneck facility in the context of the disaggregated regulatory approach. 
The starting point for this approach is to differentiate between those network 
areas in which active and/or potential competition is possible, and those network 
areas in which stable network-specific market power can be localized. 
                                                 
9   Under certain conditions it can even be shown that regulated access prices equal to 
short run variable costs would result in a unique Nash equilibrium and the utility 
would not invest (Newbery, 2000, pp. 34-36). 
10  This means that access to ports, airports or railway networks can neither be refused, 
nor granted under conditions that penalize competitors, without factual justification. 
11  The fact that use of this facility is essential for competition on the complementary 
market is occasionally expressed as a third criterion, as it reduces prices or increases 
the volumes offered. This third criterion, however, only describes the effects of ac-
cess.   9
The disaggregated regulatory approach involves applying the essential facilities 
doctrine not only on a case-by-case basis, but to a category of cases, namely to 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities. If the relevant market does not have the char-
acteristics of a natural monopoly, the application of the essential facilities doc-
trine would not only be pointless, but detrimental (e.g. Lipsky, Sidak, 1999, p. 
1220). The non-discriminatory conditions of access to the essential facilities 
must be set out in more detail as part of the disaggregated regulatory approach. 
In doing so, the application of the essential facilities doctrine must be seen in a 
dynamic context. The aim must therefore also be to design the conditions of ac-
cess so as not to hinder infrastructure competition, but instead create an incen-
tive for research and development, innovations and investments at the facility 
level. This is the only way to establish a balanced relationship between services 
and infrastructure competition. 
 
 
3.2.  Implications for new markets 
 
It is important to differentiate between network services and network infrastruc-
ture. Service markets should not be regulated, irrespective of whether they are 
old or new. Due to the absence of sunk costs no long run asymmetry between 
active providers and potential entrants exist, irrespective of whether firms pos-
sess high market shares or network externalities are relevant (see Knieps, 2006a, 
p. 52)
12. The question whether regulation of new markets could be justified is 
pointless on new markets for network services, because they are competitive. 
 
As far as infrastructure is concerned, one has to distinguish between competitive 
infrastructures and monopolistic bottlenecks. Regulation is required only for the 
latter, as duplication is unreasonably expensive. The former, however, should 
not be regulated as barriers to entry are absent. Rather, competition should not 
be hampered in order to promote innovation and growth. It would be wrong in 
particular to regulate access to a level below market price on this part of the in-
                                                 
12  Although network externalities do not create network-specific market power, its oc-
currence does not provide an argument in favour of price-structure regulation of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks instead of incentive regulation (Knieps, 2006a, p. 66).   10
frastructure in order to provide cheap access to service providers. Such an en-
deavour would reduce incentives to invest in infrastructure, diminish competi-
tive search and pre-empt technological development. 
 
It is also not justified to regard regulation holidays as a substitute for patent pro-
tection. Such a substitute is not required as every provider of a new service can 
apply for patent protection if she believes that her service or a component of it is 
an invention. Inventions have to be protected because access is too easy. For 
bottlenecks, in contrast, access is never too easy, but rather too restrictive. New 
services markets cannot be compared to a situation where certain actors should 
be protected like owners of patents. Patents have the function of fostering com-
petition for the development of new knowledge in society and optimal patent 
law only guarantees a competitive rate of return for the industry, although the 
patent holder gains a monopoly rent for a certain period. In contrast, the owner 
of a monopolistic bottleneck is the only investor taking an ex ante risk. There-
fore in an unregulated situation excessive monopoly rents occur. Thus, the anal-
ogy between network-specific market power of monopolistic bottlenecks and 
patent rents fails completely. If a communications company indeed obtains a 
patent for new equipment, which is used as input to provide a service or infra-
structure innovation, the patent law is applicable anyway. 
 
In order to allow active and potential competition on service markets, in particu-
lar new service markets, non-discriminatory access to monopolistic bottlenecks 
is necessary. To the extent that a monopolistic bottleneck is observable, ex ante 
regulation should be in place; otherwise the evolution of new service markets 
will be hampered. Innovative ways of access to existing bottlenecks should be 
guaranteed in order to allow the evolvement of new service markets.  
 
The owner of the monopolistic bottleneck can neither be forced to extend its in-
frastructure nor to do disinvestments. The reference point for economically effi-
cient investment signals is a market rate of return and not a monopolistic profit. 
Therefore, price cap regulation of a monopolistic bottleneck should not prevent 
the coverage of stand alone cost. If demand for access increases it is in the 
owner’s interest to expand the facility and vice versa if demand decreases. Thus   11
the overall responsibility for the facility can remain with the owner. Similarly, 
competitors are given correct signals to invest in alternative facilities. In particu-
lar, incremental investments, which are necessary to provide innovative network 
access, are to be covered by the demander of this innovative access. The overall 
responsibility for the network infrastructure remains with the network owner; 
otherwise regulation would foster network fragmentation. Incentive regulation 
in order to limit the level of access charges is necessary and should not be super-
seded by the argument of the importance of stimulating alternative infrastructure 
platforms. Unregulated monopolistic profits would result in investments into 
alternative access platforms and subsequent distortion between infrastructure 
and service competition. Convergence of the telecommunications and informa-
tion technology sectors and resulting infrastructure competition should lead to a 




4.    Lessons for telecommunications regulation 
 
In this section the implications of the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks for new 
telecommunications markets are derived in detail. 
 
4.1.  Towards one consistent theory: The three criteria test reconsidered 
 
In recent years the focus of regulatory attention has increasingly shifted towards 
incentives for investment. In this context the implementation of so-called ‘ac-
cess holidays’ has been proposed in order to protect investment incentives (e.g. 
Gans, King, 2003, p. 164; Baake et al., 2005). This means that it is guaranteed 
by the regulator that certain innovations, such as e.g. ‘Next Generation Net-
works’, are not regulated during a specific period of time. Thus, access holidays 
are a significant period during which an investor is free from access regulation. 
The idea is that such a holiday will increase investment incentives by allowing 
profits unhindered by regulatory intervention. 
   12
Dahlke and Neumann (2006) refer to the Framework Directive, where in recital 
27 it is pointed out that the Commission should draw guidelines which “will also 
address the issue of newly emerging markets, where de facto the market leader 
is likely to have a substantial market share but should not be subjected to inap-
propriate obligations”. They note that this text passage could be interpreted as a 
leave of absence of sector-specific regulation and argue against this reading, 
however without showing why further regulation of telecommunications mar-
kets could be justified. It is a mere pleading to maintain the status quo of the 
current regulatory system, not an explanation of how sector-specific regulation 
may evolve based on sound economics. Because regulation from this point of 
view should be a well founded exemption in a free market economy, maintain-
ing the status quo has to be justified as well. 
 
Access holidays with the goal of a delayed application of regulation can only be 
a relevant concept if regulatory problems of network-specific market power still 
exist. Market dynamics can indeed reduce regulatory requirements or make 
them completely superfluous. As long as network-specific market power does 
exist, it should be regulated, as soon as it has vanished, regulation should stop. 
In both cases “access holidays” are the wrong regulatory instrument, either re-
sulting in over- or in underregulation. In any case, cementing the status quo 
would be inadequate as well (e.g. Knieps, 2005, pp. 88-91).  
 
In order to provide a consistent regulatory framework, the three criteria in the 
Commission Recommendation of February 2003 (see European Commission, 
2003a, recital 9) have to be rewritten in economic terms. The presence of high 
and non-transitory entry barriers – criteria one – could be defined in economic 
terms as a natural monopoly in combination with sunk costs (monopolistic bot-
tlenecks). Markets that do not tend towards effective competition within the 
relevant time horizon – criteria two – could be rewritten, stating that a monopoly 
in combination with sunk costs is stable over a foreseeable future without phas-
ing-out potential. That the application of competition law alone would not ade-
quately address the market failure(s) concerned – criteria three – requires the 
consideration whether ex ante or ex post intervention is more efficient. Indeed, 
the theory of monopolistic bottleneck requires ex ante regulation of network-  13
specific market power consisting of mandatory access, instead of negotiated 
third party access (Knieps, 2006b). Non-discriminatory access should not be im-
plemented by ex post case law, but by ex ante regulation avoiding monopolistic 
access charges by incentive regulation. 
 
Only through a specific disaggregated access regulation can potentials of service 
and infrastructure competition be exhausted. There will be no technology policy 
induced bias of competition of innovation. Irrespective of market proportions, 
no network-specific market power exists on new service markets. It is possible, 
however, that new service markets create a necessity for a wider unbundling of 
the local loop.  
 
The development of the three criteria in the Commission Recommendation of 
February 2003 (see European Commission, 2003a, recital 9) can be seen as a 
refinement of the essential facilities doctrine.  So on one hand there are well-
founded principles, which can be substantiated by the theory of monopolistic 
bottlenecks, on the other hand there is a practice that thwarts these principles. 
 
Two examples may illustrate this: 
(1)  If the three criteria had been applied consistently, no end user market 
would have been recommended to be presumably in need of regulation 
(see Knieps, 2005). Also, input markets, such as interactive cable televi-
sion, internet etc., would have been specified in more detail. There, e.g. on 
the basis of the Cable Review (see European Commission, 1998), condi-
tions could have been developed that would have made regulation unnec-
essary. 
(2)  In European Commission (2003a, recital 15), the notion of “new and 
emerging markets” in which market power may be found to exist because 
of “first-mover” advantages, is not economically adequate. It is not clear 
whether the term refers to new services, new infrastructures etc. And in-
dependently of this, a “first-mover” advantage is never a reason for sec-
tor-specific regulation, because it does not create a long-run cost asymme-
try (see Stigler, 1968, pp. 67-70).   14
Therefore, it is important to emphasize that there is one consistent theory for 
localizing network-specific market power. Network economics does provide 
sound economic principles independent of the status of a market, e.g. whether it 
is an old or an emerging one. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
(1)  If competing infrastructure platforms do exist, sector-specific market 
power regulation is no longer justifiable. This statement is in accordance 
with the first criterion postulated by the EU Commission and can be sub-
stantiated by the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks. 
(2)  If a bottleneck is not stable for the decision-relevant time horizon, regula-
tion of sector-specific market power should be phased out. This statement 
is in accordance with the second criterion of the Commission Recommen-
dation, which states that only those markets should be subject to regula-
tion, the structure of which does not tend towards effective competition 
within the relevant time horizon.  
(3)  The essential facilities doctrine is to be applied independent of whether 
markets are old or new. Concerning this matter, the Access Notice should 
be kept in mind. Mandatory access instead of negotiated third party access 
should be implemented in order to guarantee non-discriminatory access to 
monopolistic bottlenecks. This requirement is in accordance with the third 
criterion of the Commission Recommendation. “Access holidays” are not 
a solution to regulatory problems.   
 
Seemingly, what qualifies as a monopolistic bottleneck is still as controversial 
today as it was some years ago, when the notion of the bottleneck was generally 
not limited to monopolistic bottlenecks. Ungerer (2000, p. 235) e.g. showed a 
table headed “Network Access requirements of Service Providers”, including 
technical functions of coordination (e.g. numbering schemes which belong in the 
field of technical regulation). 
   15
The question arises whether new markets create new bottlenecks or extend the 
borderlines of existing bottlenecks. Since there are competing long-distance 
networks, the focus is on network access. In the current debate, the relevancy of 
one superior fiber-to-the-home network is excluded. Instead, a multiplicity of 
alternative upgrading strategies seems possible, together with competing infra-
structure platforms. The fiber to the curb upgrading strategy of Deutsche Tele-
kom is only one example (c.f. Büllingen, Stamm, 2001, 61f.). 
 
Competing infrastructure platforms result in monopolistic infrastructure compe-
tition. The natural monopoly paradigm disappears and subsequently the need for 
bottleneck regulation disappears also. 
 
As long as competing network infrastructure does not exist, remaining bottle-
neck regulation is relevant. However, the borderline of the bottleneck does not 
expand. There is a multiplicity of upgrading strategies based on copper-wired 
loops as well as based on ductwork etc.  Fibre cables similar to DSLAM are part 
of upgrading infrastructure and do not belong to the remaining bottleneck.   
 
 
4.2.  Platform competition vs. access regulation to ducts:  
     A practical application  
 
Sector-specific regulation of services lacks any economic basis. Neither old nor 
new services are a case for sector-specific market power regulation; the question 
is always whether upstream markets create monopolistic bottlenecks for com-
petitors.  
 
Three kinds of transmission qualities on service markets can be differentiated 
according to the products provided: 
−  Narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN, GSM  
−  Semi high-speed broadband services like broadband internet access up to 6 
Mbps download and  
−  VDSL services up to 50 Mbps   16
As long as, due to the absence of alternative network infrastructures, a monopo-
listic bottleneck in the local infrastructure network exists, the question arises 
what the remaining bottleneck components are for these different markets. In the 
following we will demonstrate the shrinking-bottleneck hypothesis (see follow-


















































































































For narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN the components belonging to the mo-
nopolistic bottleneck are local switch facilities, copper loops, ductworks and 
ducts. 
 
In order to provide DSL services, local switch facilities are no longer necessary. 
Access to copper cable is necessary. Competing providers can implement alter-
native network upgrading strategies, e.g. upgraded copper cable by DSLAMs. 
Modems etc. are definitely not assets that can be characterized as sunk costs. A 
parallel investment into modems cannot be considered as socially inefficient 
cost duplication, because this is the only way to achieve the potentials for a large 
scope of innovative network services.  
 
The provision of VDSL services is not possible without investing into fibre to 
the curb or fibre to the home. In order to be able to apply upgrading strategies by   17
means of fibre cable, access to ductworks and ducts is necessary. A roll out of 
fibre optic networks does not require a duplication of ductworks. Rather, fibre 
cables can be laid between relevant points in existing ductworks. Fibre cables, 
cabinets and optical modems are components of upgrading infrastructure in or-
der to provide VDSL-services. Similar to the situation of competing upgrading 
strategies by DSLAM on the basis of copper, competing upgrading strategies by 
means of fibre cables and other upgrading components are possible on the basis 
of ducts and ductworks. As an alternative to local telecommunications network 
infrastructures, ducts and ductworks from electricity or water companies may be 
available as well. Thus, ex ante regulation of access to ducts and ductworks is 
required, if the following two conditions are fulfilled: 
 
(1)     Alternative infrastructures for end customers (e.g. interactive broadband 
cable) are not in place; 
(2)   Alternative duct networks, which can be upgraded for VDSL-purposes at 
reasonable cost, are not available.  
 
A differentiated unbundling and concomitant incentive regulation is then re-
quired, consisting of an accounting separation regime (e.g. European Commis-
sion, 2005) in combination with price cap regulation. Only then, alternative car-
riers are able to be become active in upgrading investments (e.g. fibre, modems) 
in order to provide VDSL-services.  
 
This case is interesting from the point of view of the situation in Switzerland. 
Almost all Swiss households have a choice between more than one network 
internet access provider. Access regulation to ducts and ductworks therefore was 
only implemented based on the revised telecommunications law
13 to ensure that 
access to these facilities is guaranteed in cases where competing infrastructures 
are not yet in place. 
 
                                                 
13  Fernmeldegesetz (FMG), revision of the Swiss Telecommunications Act of March 
24, 2006, Art. 11 (1. f.) (http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/3565.pdf).   18
The crucial question is whether there are input markets that an operator needs to 
have access to in order to deliver services to (end) customers and which are 
characterized as monopolistic bottlenecks. In a world where several IP-based 
high-speed platforms are competing, no market power regulation at all will be 
necessary. Products like IPTV, IP-Telephony, very high-speed internet access 
etc. are delivered over several different platforms. In this case, if some competi-
tors, due to their path dependency, continue to use an older technology, e.g. 
PSTN/ISDN, none of these high-tech platform providers should be forced to 
support this older technology, only to afford their rivals customer access. The 
entrepreneurial decision to stop offering services based on outdated technologies 
that some competitors still depend upon should not be impeded by regulators. 
 
It is important to see that the competence for network design should always re-
main with the network operator. On the basis of the essential facilities doctrine, 
regulators cannot force a network operator either to build a new network, or to 
upgrade an established one, or to rebuild a network (e.g. to abrogate switches or 
copper loops). This shows that the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is capable 
of meeting concerns regarding the dynamic development of telecommunica-
tions, although the criteria for localizing network-specific market power possess 
similar validity for other (stationary) network sectors. Criteria for defining 
where network-specific market power still remains do not depend on the emer-
gence of new markets. Nevertheless, ultimately the market dynamics of service 
markets will inevitably lead to a shrinking of the monopolistic bottleneck within 





Our main results can be summarized in five points: 
(1)   There are intentions within the EU to reduce the extent of regulation, in 
particular regarding new telecommunications services. The EU Commis-
sion’s endeavour is, however, not specifically network oriented.    19
(2)   Therefore the Commission ends up with a regulation that is too broad and 
not targeted toward monopolistic bottlenecks which represent the main 
problem of competition in telecommunications. 
(3)   Alternatively, we propose an economic approach to regulation for the field 
of telecommunications. We focus on network-specific market power as the 
relevant long term entry barrier preventing competition. In the course of 
dynamic network and service competition, network-specific market power 
is likely to shrink. 
(4)   In order to provide a consistent regulatory framework the three criteria test 
has to be reformulated. Former high and non-transitory entry barriers (crite-
ria one) now become natural monopoly barriers in combination with sunk 
costs. Lack of a tendency towards effective competition within the relevant 
time horizon (criteria two) should be rewritten stating that a natural mo-
nopoly in combination with sunk costs is stable over a foreseeable future. 
The application of competition law alone would not adequately address the 
market failure(s) concerned (criteria three). Instead, ex ante regulation of 
network-specific market power, consisting of non-discriminatory manda-
tory access and incentive regulation of access charges, is required. 
(5)   Practical evidence supports the hypothesis of a shrinking monopolistic bot-
tleneck. The example of Switzerland moreover shows that alternative broad 
band network carriers are feasible in one market and that regulated access 
to duct networks can open access to network suppliers in those areas where 
alternative broad band infrastructure is not yet available.   20
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